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THE CRITIQUE AND PRAXIS OF RIGHTS
BERNARD E. HARCOURT*
The critique of rights has played a crowning role in critical
philosophy. From Hegel to Marx, to Foucault and beyond—Duncan Kennedy, Christoph Menke, the contributors to this Symposium—the critique of rights has always represented an essential
and inescapable step in the critique of modern Western society.1
The reason is plain: conceptions of natural rights, human rights,
and civil rights have been central to the founding of modern political thought (from Hobbes, Locke, and Wollstonecraft forward), to the birth and flourishing of legal and political liberalism (in Rawls and Habermas), to the establishment of regimes
of civil and political rights, and to the institutionalization of international human rights. Rights are the principal foundation
for the discourse and practices of Western liberal democracies.
Thus, the critique of rights is an indispensable step in challenging the failures of liberal political theory and liberal legalism. Of
this, there is little doubt.
The trouble, though, arises in the relation between the critique of rights and critical praxis. The critique of rights often is
either too theoretically rigid and autonomous to allow for a constructive dialogue with critical praxis, or too plastic and malleable to engage praxis in a productive way. This problem tends to
coincide, on the one hand, with an overly technical philosophical
critique of rights, or, on the other hand, with an overly porous
juridical critique of rights.
*Columbia University; École des hautes études en sciences sociales. Special thanks
to Elizabeth Anker and Justin Desautels-Stein for organizing this symposium.
1. See generally G.F.W. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1820); Karl
Marx, On the Jewish Question, reprinted in 3 MARX AND ENGELS: COLLECTED
WORKS 146 (Lawrence & Wishart eds. 2010); MICHEL FOUCAULT, PENAL THEORIES
AND INSTITUTIONS: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1971–1972 (Bernard E.
Harcourt ed., 2019); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE
SIÈCLE) (1998); CHRISTOPH MENKE, CRITIQUE OF RIGHTS (Christopher Turner
trans., Polity Press 2020) (2015); ELIZABETH S. ANKER, ON PARADOX: THE CLAIMS
OF THEORY (forthcoming); JUSTIN DESAUTELS-STEIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
STYLE: A STRUCTURALIST HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRAGMATISM AND LIBERAL LEGAL
THOUGHT (2018); Symposium, The Stakes for Critical Legal Theory 92 U. COLO. L.
REV. 945 (2021).
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At one extreme, an overly technical philosophical critique of
rights can lead to theoretical heights that do not leave room for
constructive engagement with critical practice. It often produces
a critique that is too abstract to be in conversation with more
mundane legal struggles. It may result, for instance, in a new
conception of rights, even perhaps a “new right” tied to political
community, that leaves few, if any, resources for engagement on
the real legal terrain structured around individual rights. Or it
may produce a conception of law as superstructural, in which
case legal interventions become superfluous at best or a hindrance at worst: along these lines, the real struggle for emancipation takes place on the political battlefield beyond legal
praxis; even worse, incremental legal improvements may delay
or hinder the achievement of genuine social transformation. The
overly philosophical critique often makes it difficult or impossible to initiate a productive conversation with critical legal practice.
At the other extreme, an overly porous or plastic juridical
critique of rights may result in an instrumental or weaponized
conception of rights that offers little purchase for critical legal
practice. It may produce an empty or hollow view of rights, in
which case the critical theoretical contribution no longer has anything to offer legal practice. Liberal rights become purely rhetorical tools or strategic weapons that can be deployed in court
in any manner to achieve a desired political objective; but the
critique of rights offers little guidance on how to deploy them.
The critique is no longer in conversation with how to craft those
rights claims, nor how their deployment will contribute to
achieving the broader political objectives. Here, rights become
pure tactics. What this calls for, then, is just legal expertise—
skilled trial or appellate lawyers—who need not even engage in
critical theory.
At both extremes, there is a disjuncture between the critique of rights and the critical practice of rights. And for those of
us critical theorists who also engage in critical legal practice,
this disjuncture is not only problematic—it is unbearable. The
gap between critical theory and praxis can be utterly agonizing
because there inevitably arise times when critical legal praxis
necessarily entails deploying individual rights claims within a
liberal legal framework. Whether these involve the representation of women or men sentenced to death and awaiting execution
on death row, or of men indefinitely detained at Guantanamo
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Bay, there is often no way to avoid engaging in liberal rights discourse. There is no option but to claim liberal rights. To be sure,
the deployment of rights will always take place within the larger
context of political struggles and community organizing; but in
order for these women and men to stay alive, literally, there is
often no choice but to engage in litigation that draws on traditional liberal conceptions of due process and equal rights. There
is simply no alternative.
And here, neither the overly philosophical critique that may
point toward a new conception of rights or toward abstractions
that are untethered from the courtroom, nor the overly juridical
critical position that, in the end, turns rights into mere tactics,
helps in the actual struggle or advances the cause of justice.
It is for this reason that contemporary critical thought requires a more constant confrontation between theoria and
praxis. The two must nourish each other—and nourish the critical values that have been at the source of critical philosophy
since its inception. In effect, the critique of rights must constantly confront and be confronted by critical praxis.
***
Let me illustrate this by discussing several cases that I am
presently litigating, involving men who are on death row or detained at Guantanamo Bay.
By way of background, it is important to emphasize that
their confinement is the product of waves of procedural reforms
that have reshaped the rule of law in the United States—from
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 to the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. These legal reforms have restructured due process rights, but within the framework of the rule of
law. As I argue elsewhere, they do not amount to a state of exception; instead, they have transformed the rule of law in the
United States, in a fully legal manner.2 All of the mechanisms
(effectively denying habeas review on the merits, permitting indefinite detention) have been implemented legally and are justified by the federal courts. They have all been made part of the
rule of law—not just by a conservative president like George W.
2. See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE COUNTERREVOLUTION: HOW
OUR GOVERNMENT WENT TO WAR AGAINST ITS OWN CITIZENS 213–32 (2018) (chapter on “A State of Legality”).
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Bush, nor a white nationalist president like Donald Trump, but
by liberal rule-of-law presidents like Bill Clinton and Barack
Obama as well.3
Despite that, the only legal arguments I have on behalf of
these men on death row or at Guantanamo Bay rest on claims to
individual rights, specifically claims to due process of law, the
right to have one’s case heard and considered by a tribunal; or
claims to rights guaranteed by the Suspension Clause, the right
not to have the ancient writ of habeas corpus withdrawn arbitrarily; or claims to the right to effective assistance of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment, and so on.
From a critical theoretic perspective, then, the pressing
question is how the critique of rights can enter into dialogue with
the demands of such litigation. How can the critique of rights
enrich critical legal praxis? If the answer ultimately boils down
to: “Well, rights are just tactics, so use the best legal argument
you can, knowing that these are just rhetorical tools,” then there
is no longer any need for critique—just for litigation skill. Alternatively, if the answer is that civil and political rights are of little value compared to true human emancipation, or that we
should imagine a new conception of rights that is tied to the
broader political community and not the individual, then again,
the critique of rights offers no purchase for my political and legal
struggles.
The only way forward is to confront critical theory and
praxis. Not to apply theory to practice, nor to allow praxis to
drive theory, but instead to constantly counter the two in a type
of relentless confrontation that, hopefully, nourishes both but
does not dictate any directionality from one to the other. This
could be described as a dialectical opposition, but without reconciliation—more of a confrontation imagined through the lens of
pure negativity, as in Adorno’s negative dialectics, yet a negative
dialectics that is nevertheless productive (which may well have
been a contradiction in terms for Adorno).4 The important point
here is that critical theory should not “guide” praxis, any more
than praxis should “dictate” theory. There has to be a constant
back-and-forth, so that theory challenges praxis, and
3.
4.

Id. at 10–12.
See 7/13: Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, COLUM. CTR. FOR
CONTEMP. CRITICAL THOUGHT (Dec. 18, 2019), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/critique1313/7-13/ [https://perma.cc/X9QN-GRCS] (presentation by Martin Saar at
The Institute for Social Research (Institut für Sozialforschung, IfS)).
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simultaneously praxis confronts critical theory—and in that encounter, both are transformed and enriched.
Confrontation, contradiction: this is ultimately the only viable space for the critique and praxis of rights. In my decades
representing condemned men in Alabama, I have constantly confronted the contradictions within liberal legalism, never resolving them but ultimately growing and expanding my critical
praxis to challenge not just the ineffective assistance of counsel
that so often saturates these death cases, but also the broader
punitive society that is the condition of possibility of pervasive
racial, class, poverty, sexuality, and other injustice. My critical
practice has evolved over years, in confrontation with critical
theory, to the point where today I embrace an abolitionist democracy ambition aimed not only at ending the death penalty in the
United States, but also at the larger goal of abolishing our punitive paradigm of governing—of abolishing our punitive society
more broadly—and replacing it with a just society.5
***
This constant confrontation has led me to reconceptualize
my own litigation and deployment of rights discourse through
the lens of W.E.B. Du Bois’s idea of “abolition democracy.” It has
opened new pathways to rethink critical practice, even to
reimagine legal arguments about individual due process rights.
The framework of abolition democracy, developed in the
writings of W.E.B. Du Bois, Angela Davis, and others, seeks to
abolish racial injustice and extractive logics in order to instantiate a coöperationist future infused with solidarity, equality, and
social justice.6 Du Bois coined the term “abolition democracy” in
5. I develop this at greater length in chapter 18 of my book CRITIQUE &
PRAXIS: A CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ILLUSIONS, VALUES, AND ACTION (2020).
6. See generally W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA, 1860–
1880 (Free Press 1998) (1935); ANGELA DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY: BEYOND
EMPIRE, PRISONS, AND TORTURE (2005) [hereinafter DAVIS, ABOLITION
DEMOCRACY]; ANGELA DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2019); Allegra M.
McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156 (2015);
MARIAME KABA, WE DO THIS ‘TIL WE FREE US (Tamara K. Nopper ed., 2021); Rachel Kushner, Is Prison Necessary? Ruth Wilson Gilmore Might Change Your
Mind, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/magazine/prison-abolition-ruth-wilson-gilmore.html [https://perma.cc/5CNM-JDBW];
Amna A. Akbar, The Left Is Remaking the World, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/11/opinion/sunday/defund-police-cancel-

980

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

his study Black Reconstruction in America, published in 1935, to
denote the ambition necessary to achieve a racially just society.
Du Bois argued that the reconstructive work necessary to
achieve a racially just society, begun in 1867, was aborted with
the demise of Reconstruction in 1877. The result was that the
abolition of slavery was only accomplished in the narrow sense
that chattel slavery was ended; but the true ambition of abolition, namely the creation of a racially just society, was never realized. The true ambition required the construction of new institutions, new practices, new social relations that would have
afforded freed Black men and women the economic, political, and
social capital to live as equal members of society.
The vision of a full and uncompromised reconstruction of
American society is what Du Bois called the project of “abolition
democracy.” That project was thwarted by white resistance and
terror during the decade following the end of the Civil War, and
ultimately abandoned due to the political compromise of 1876
that resulted in the negotiated election of President Rutherford
B. Hayes and the withdrawal of federal troops from the South.
As Du Bois and Davis argued, the full ambition of abolition democracy also requires reimagining the economy from the ground
up. It entails rethinking the profit motive and the circulation of
wealth. In this sense, the ideal of abolition democracy must be
understood to include—in addition to the (negative) abolition of
institutions of domination and the (positive) creation of new social institutions—the radical transformation of our political
economy.
Du Bois demonstrated that the mere abolition of chattel
slavery, without the ensuing effort to realize the ambition of abolition democracy, facilitated the reproduction of racial oppression and a slave-like society. With the demise of Reconstruction,
the criminal law and its enforcement replaced property law as
the key to confining freed Black women and men to a new condition of enslavement through the implementation of Black Codes
that imposed severe punishments and labor restrictions on
rent.html [https://perma.cc/ARP2-K9T4]; Alexis Hoag, Valuing Black Lives: A Case
for Ending the Death Penalty, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 985 (2020); Derecka
Purnell, How I Became a Police Abolitionist, ATLANTIC (July 6, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/how-i-became-police-abolitionist/613540/ [https://perma.cc/8RWF-KHGG]; Abolition Democracy 13/13, COLUM.
CTR. FOR CONTEMP. CRITICAL THOUGHT (Jan. 21, 2021), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/abolition1313/ [https://perma.cc/PT8W-2NYR].
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African American women and men. Convict leasing and plantation prisons gave birth to new forms of slavery, protected by the
exceptions clause to the Thirteenth Amendment.7 “The whole
criminal system came to be used as a method of keeping Negroes
at work and intimidating them,” Du Bois wrote.8 Du Bois added:
In no part of the modern world has there been so open and
conscious a traffic in crime for deliberate social degradation
and private profit as in the South since slavery. . . . Since
1876 Negroes have been arrested on the slightest provocation
and given long sentences or fines which they were compelled
to work out. The resulting peonage of criminals extended into
every Southern state and led to the most revolting situations.9

The penal law served to transform American slavery into a
system of peonage that, in some cases, exceeded the horrors of
the Antebellum period. The enforcement of the criminal law reproduced a system of racial injustice in America that continues
to the present. As brilliant critical thinkers have demonstrated
since the publication of Du Bois’s book in 1935—including Angela Davis, Michelle Alexander, Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Mariame
Kaba, Dorothy Roberts, Bryan Stevenson, and many more—we
live today in the continuing legacy of slavery and its aftermath.10
***
The critical framework of abolition democracy not only confronts my own legal representation of men on death row or at
Guantanamo—it offers a path to enrich it. I may be limited to
7.
8.
9.
10.

Roberts, supra note 6, at 29, 68–70.
DU BOIS, supra note 6, at 506.
Id. at 698.
See, e.g., DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY, supra note 6; MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010); KABA, supra note 6; KUSHNER, supra note 6; DOROTHY E.
ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF
LIBERTY 22–55 (1997); Bryan Stevenson, A Presumption of Guilt, in POLICING THE
BLACK MAN 3–30 (Angela J. Davis ed., 2017); KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE
CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
URBAN AMERICA (2010); ISABEL WILKERSON, CASTE: THE ORIGINS OF OUR
DISCONTENTS (2020); McLeod, supra note 6.
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arguing in court about individual due process rights, the Suspension Clause, or the right to effective assistance of counsel—
given the case law and the procedural posture of, say, litigating
a stay of execution—but the confrontation with critical theory
has deepened and enriched how I can present those legal arguments.
Drawing on Dorothy Roberts’s writings on “Abolition Constitutionalism,” for instance, it is possible to cast due process
rights in a new light, a more historicized light, that places them
within a more robust framework of opposition to oppressive
forms of punishment.11 In her brilliant work, Roberts offers a
new way to conceive of the Reconstruction Amendments and the
history of their enactment. Roberts traces a history of the Thirteenth Amendment that demonstrates why the exceptions
clause to the prohibition of slavery—“except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted”12—
should be far more narrowly construed than it has been, and that
its history actually provides evidence for penal abolition.13 This
interpretation has tremendous implications for due process
rights more generally, including for the interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments incorporated to apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
The Reconstruction Amendments, after all, were intended
to radically transform the original interpretations of the Bill of
Rights. As Roberts uncovers, Senator Charles Sumner originally
proposed the Thirteenth Amendment without the exceptions
clause;14 and the Republican drafters of the amendment did not
believe that the exceptions clause allowed for convict leasing or
forced labor.15 The history contradicts the dominant post-Reconstruction readings, which ended up being far more conservative.16 As Roberts writes, “both the abolition constitutionalism
that inspired the Thirteenth Amendment and the words and actions of its radical framers suggest we should read the Punishment Clause quite narrowly.”17 Roberts adds:
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See Roberts, supra note 6.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
Roberts, supra note 6, at 66.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 69.
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[T]he antislavery origins of the Reconstruction Amendments
have been obscured by a revisionist historiography that
downplays the influence and importance of the abolitionist
constitutionalism that preceded the Amendments’ passage.
Antislavery activists not only chose to fight on constitutional
ground, but, in the process, also crafted an alternative reading of the Constitution that proved highly influential for a
period of time.18

Today, this reading may also prove highly influential and
useful to recast individual due process rights more broadly in
habeas corpus litigation. By focusing on the abolition constitutionalism of the antislavery framers, and their larger opposition
to punitive excess, it may be possible to reframe the protections
afforded by rights to due process and to be free from cruel and
unusual punishments.
In her work, Roberts effectively seizes constitutional law
discourse and critically marshals it in support of an abolitionist
agenda. Rather than cede the ground, Roberts identifies a path
forward to use the history of the Reconstruction Amendments
toward broader prison abolitionism. This reflects, in an interesting way, the journey that Frederick Douglass himself took during the earlier debates over the “usefulness” of the Constitution—over whether it was a pro-slavery document that could
serve no purpose or rather a source of authority for an abolitionist future.19
***
Through conflict and friction, and the constant back-andforth between praxis and theory, it may be possible to enrich the
critique and praxis of rights. Critical theory cannot just engage
in critique or diagnose crises. Critical theory is not just about
Krise und Kritik. It is also about critique and praxis—especially
in these times of acute crises. What we need, then, is constant
confrontation between the critique and the praxis of rights.
In many ways, this is precisely what we have witnessed in
the United States in the wake of the police killings of George
Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Carlos Ingram-Lopez, and so many other
18.
19.

Id. at 50 (citation omitted).
Id. at 58–62.
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persons of color. Since that horrific eight-minute-and-forty-sixsecond video of the murder of George Floyd, we have seen an
uprising for Black lives like we had rarely seen before, not only
in the United States, but across the globe, and a reckoning—
however too late and too little—with structural racism. This too
is the product of the confrontation between critique and praxis.
In the wake of the renewed movement for Black lives, we
are all quickly becoming familiar with a world of critical praxis
and radical experimentation that has historically been outside
the mainstream. Occupations, temporary autonomous zones,
street riders, flash mobilizations, “walls of moms,” and “leafblower dads”—new and creative forms of protest are becoming
headline news on mainstream media across the country.
That’s a change. A renewed and rejuvenated conversation
over critical praxis is flourishing in the United States and elsewhere, inspired in part by the earlier experiments at Occupy
Wall Street and #BlackLivesMatter, by Bernie Sanders’s call for
“political revolution,” as well as by the Hong Kong protests, the
Yellow Vest movement in France, and the occupations at Tahrir
Square and Gezi Park earlier in 2011. These protest movements
have breathed new life into political resistance—and also into
critical theory.
It is high time. For too long now, critique has been distracted from its true ambition: to change the world. It had retreated to the earlier task of only interpreting the world—with
Gramsci’s idea of cultural hegemony, the Frankfurt School’s critique of ideology, Louis Althusser’s notes on ideological state apparatuses, Foucault’s theories of knowledge-power and, later, regimes of truth, Derrida’s deconstructive practices. Brilliant, all,
but these theories distracted critique from its true ambition.
It is time to get back to the true ambition of critical theory.
It is time—past time, I argue—to imagine a new critical praxis
theory for the twenty-first century. This is the task: to counter
decades of contemplative complacency and to return critical
praxis to its central place in critical philosophy. This calls for a
profusion of critical debate over not just the critique of rights,
but the critical praxis of rights as well, because, in the end, the
aim of critical philosophy is to change the world.

